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 THE DARK SIDE OF THE BAKKEN BOOM: PROTECTING 
THE IMPORTANCE OF AN OIL AND GAS LEASE’S BONUS 
PAYMENT THROUGH A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE 
AMELIORATION OF IRISH OIL AND GAS,  
INCORPORATED V. RIEMER 
ABSTRACT 
 
As the Bakken oil boom matures, North Dakota courts are increasingly 
encountering questions concerning the validity of oil and gas leases, 
including whether a lessee’s failure to timely tender a paid-up lease’s bonus 
constitutes a complete or partial failure of consideration.  In Irish Oil and 
Gas, Incorporated v. Riemer, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that it 
could not rule that a lessee’s failure to timely tender a paid-up lease’s bonus 
necessarily constitutes a complete failure of consideration because the 
lease’s royalty interest may constitute sufficient consideration.  Regardless 
of the decision’s legal merits, this holding unfortunately usurps lessor-
lessee relations by realigning the risks associated with a lease’s execution 
and relegates lessors to pursuing inefficient forms of legal recourse that 
cannot account for the potential economic cost of the lessee’s conduct.  In 
order to rectify these and other policy concerns, this article will argue that 
North Dakota should adopt a statute that automatically terminates a lease, 
without the need for judicial intervention, if a lessee fails to tender a lease’s 
bonus within thirty days of the lease’s execution, the lessor subsequently 
notifies the lessee, in writing, of such a delinquency, and the lessee fails to 
redress the situation within fifteen additional days.  To do otherwise 
subjects unsophisticated lessors to the mercurial and capricious whims of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Bakken shale formation is a 200,000 square mile geological region 
that encompasses parts of Montana, North Dakota, and Saskatchewan.1  
Scientists estimate that the Bakken contains in excess of 500 billion barrels 
 
1.  See generally Toni Tease, The Bakken Boom is Producing Not Only Oil but Also Creative 
Juices, 38 MONTANA LAW. 22 (2012).  For simplicity’s sake, this article refers to all geographical 
formations in western North Dakota as “the Bakken.” 
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of oil,2 of which, approximately 4 billion barrels are recoverable with 
contemporary technology.3  Amerada Oil first tapped the Bakken’s 
potential in 1951,4 and thereafter, North Dakota experienced intermittent 
spates of boom and bust development.5  Recent advances in hydraulic 
fracking have ushered in a prosperous era of Bakken development as 
operators have enjoyed a drilling success rate of 99% in certain parts of the 
state.6  This success has propelled North Dakota’s oil production to 931,000 
barrels of oil per day,7 and some estimate that North Dakota could produce 
1.3 million barrels of oil per day by 2023 and 2 million barrels of oil per 
day by 2029.8 
Despite this prosperity, the oil industry remains laden with numerous 
risks,9 and one must understand the context in which such risks occur in 
order to appreciate how these risks threaten lessor interests.  In developing 
an understanding of these risks, this article begins by exploring how the 
various types of promises contained in oil and gas leases relate to the 
contractual precept of consideration.  As a corollary, the article continues 
by examining how a party’s potential breach of the lease in relation to the 
consideration supporting the lease may excuse a party from the lease.  After 
this survey, the article addresses the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
decision in Irish Oil & Gas, Incorporated v. Riemer and how the majority 
and dissent’s respective opinions appear to rest on tenuous legal 
underpinnings.  Notwithstanding these legal issues, the article then 
examines how Irish Oil may adversely affect lessor interests and how North 
Dakota can go about remedying the problems potentially associated with 
Irish Oil.  Finally, the article concludes by briefly touching upon various 
 
2.  Leonardo Maugeri, Oil:  The Next Revolution:  The Unprecedented Upsurge of Oil 
Production Capacity and What it Means for the World, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFS., 
HARV. KENNEDY SCH., June 2012, at 2. 
3.  UNIV. OF N.D ENERGY & ENV’T RESEARCH CTR., Bakken Formation Resource 
Estimates, available at http://www.undeerc.org/bakken/oilproduction.aspx.  Some have concluded 
that the Bakken may eventually produce up to 24 billion barrels of oil.  See Stephen Moore, The 
Weekend Interview with Harold Hamm:  How North Dakota Became Saudi Arabia, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 1, 2011, at A13. 
4.  Owen Anderson, Introduction:  North Dakota Energy Landscape, 85 N.D. L. REV. 715, 
715 (2010). 
5.  Id. at 719. 
6.  See N.D. Indus. Comm’n, Oil and Gas Frequently Asked Questions, pg. 7, available at 
www nd.gov/ndic/ogrp/info/g-015-033-faq.pdf. 
7.  Nick Smith, Oil Drilling Expected to Remain Strong, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 12, 2013, 
available at http://bismarcktribune.com/bakken/oil-drilling-expected-to-stay-
strong/article_82ebe8d6-6375-11e3-9aa5-001a4bcf887a html. 
8.  James Mason, Bakken’s Maximum Potential Oil Production Rate Explored, OIL & GAS J., 
available at http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-4/exploration-development/bakken-s-
maximum html. 
9.  See Anderson, supra note 4, at 719-20. 
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methods that lessors can employ to adequately protect their interests from 
Irish Oil. 
A. OIL AND GAS LAW AND CONSIDERATION 
From its inception, oil and gas law experienced a peculiar development 
because courts and legislatures could not refer to English law in developing 
governing doctrines.10  Due to this precedential void, the legal community 
struggled to reconcile principles from other subsets of law into governing 
axioms,11 and oil and gas law became the product of case-law at its worst.12  
Nevertheless, the legal community articulated various black letter rules that 
transcended jurisdictional inconsistencies, including the rule that oil and gas 
leases are contracts.13  Accordingly, although leases are unique14 and 
concern nearly every classification of property interest,15 leases must still 
ascribe to basic contracting principles. 
Among other requirements to form a legally binding agreement,16 
contracting parties must support a contract with sufficient consideration.17  
Generally, any benefit that the promisor agrees to confer upon the promisee 
may constitute sufficient consideration,18 regardless of whether such 
consideration is inadequate given the circumstances.19  Where sufficient 
consideration initially validated a contract, a party’s breach of the contract 
causes either a complete or partial failure of consideration, each of which 
contains its own remedies.20  Courts will excuse a party from a contract 
when it experienced a complete failure of consideration,21 which occurs 
where a party “failed to perform a substantial part of its obligation so as to 
 
10.  Patick H. Martin, Unbundling the Executive Right:  A Guide to Interpretation of the 
Power to Lease and Develop Oil and Gas Interests, 37 NAT. RES. J. 311, 312 (1997). 
11.  Id. at 313.  For instance, North Dakota recognized that principles governing property law 
actually hindered the oil industry’s growth.  See Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 1997 ND 31, ¶ 
12, 559 N.W.2d 841. 
12.  See Martin, supra note 10, at 312. 
13.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-01 (1943) (“Leasing is a contract . . . .”).  Courts, however, 
also construe leases to be conveyances of real property.  See Petroleum Exchange v. Poynter, 64 
N.W.2d 718, 722 (N.D. 1954) (holding that “oil, gas and mineral leases are conveyances of 
interests in real property”). 
14.  Ramsey v. Grizzle, 313 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. App. 2010). 
15.  Moorer v. Bethlehem Baptist Church, 130 So.2d 367, 371 (Ala. 1961). 
16.  A valid contract also requires that consenting parties, who are capable of contracting, 
execute the agreement for a lawful purpose.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-01-02 (1943).   
17.  Id. 
18.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-05-01 (1943). 
19.  Harrington v. Harrington, 365 N.W.2d 552, 555 (N.D. 1985) (“If consideration . . . 
exists, courts will generally not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration.”).   
20.  First Nat. Bank of Belfield v. Burich, 367 N.W.2d 148, 152-53 (N.D. 1985). 
21.  Check Control, Inc. v. Shepherd, 462 N.W.2d 644, 647 (N.D. 1990). 
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defeat the very object of the agreement.”22  Contrastingly, a court will only 
award monetary damages in an instance concerning a partial failure of 
consideration, which occurs where the party’s failure to perform under the 
contract leaves other sufficient consideration to sustain the contract.23  Due 
to this differentiation, it is imperative to determine whether a party’s failure 
to perform under the contract constituted a complete or partial failure of 
consideration.  Courts will generally consider such an inquiry based upon 
the facts of a given case;24 however, “[i]ssues of fact may become issues of 
law for the court if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion 
from the facts.”25 
Pursuant to these principles, any benefit conferred upon the lessor or 
detriment suffered by the lessee may constitute sufficient consideration in 
the context of oil and gas leases.26  In exchange for the lessor granting the 
lessee the right to develop the lessor’s property, a lessee generally offers 
consideration consisting of a bonus, royalty interests, and delay rental 
payments.27  Courts consider the lease’s royalty interest the lease’s primary 
consideration28 so that a covenant to develop the property along with a 
promise to pay royalties if production occurs from such development 
constitutes sufficient consideration.29  However, lessees generally contract 
around this covenant of development by using drilling-delay rental clauses, 
which obviate any such covenant by “giving the lessee the right to maintain 
the lease . . . by paying delay rentals instead of starting drilling 
operations.”30  Such a combination constitutes sufficient consideration 
because the lessee is either obligated to pay royalties if development occurs 
or pay delay rentals if development has yet to occur on the property.31  
Although the exchange of this consideration constitutes sufficient 
 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id.  Although the determination as to what constitutes a “substantial” failure to perform 
will be predicated upon the particularities of the given situation, one can discern the nature of a 
“substantial” breach by recognizing the distinction between a complete and partial failure of 
consideration.  Since a partial failure of consideration occurs only where the breach of contract 
leaves sufficient consideration to sustain the contract, it stands to reason that a breach of contract 
is “substantial” where such breach leaves no other sufficient consideration to sustain the contract 
because such a situation would preclude a breach of contract from being classified as a partial 
failure of consideration.   
24.  Id. at 647. 
25.  Groleau v. Bjornson Oil Co., Inc., 2004 ND 55, ¶ 6, 676 N.W.2d 763, 767. 
26.  See 38 AM. JUR. 2d Gas & Oil § 25 (1968). 
27.  19A MICH. CIV. JUR. Oil & Natural Gas § 32 (2014). 
28.  3A SUMMERS OIL & GAS § 31:1 (3d ed. 2012). 
29.  58 C.J.S. Mines & Minerals § 280 (2009); 38 AM. JUR. 2d Gas & Oil § 25 (1968). 
30.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (9th ed. 2009). 
31.  12 B.E. WITKIN ET AL, Summary of Cal. Law § 799(2) (10th ed. 2000). 
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consideration, lessees also offer bonus payments, which are commonly 
referred to as “signing bonuses.” 
B.  BONUS PAYMENTS AS CONSIDERATION 
As competition for sought-after property increased, lessees began 
utilizing a one-time bonus payment to differentiate themselves from other 
lessees in attempting to induce the lessor to execute a lease in the lessee’s 
favor.32  As such, a bonus is the consideration for the lessor’s execution of 
the lease33 that provides the lessor with a speculative inducement to enter 
the lease insofar as the lessee will be able to collect additional royalties if 
production occurs on the property.34  The amount a lessee is willing to pay 
as a bonus is contingent upon the perceived value of the lessor’s property, 
whether the lessor’s property is located in proven production areas, and tax 
consequences.35  Because these circumstances are localized, lessees have 
paid bonuses from $5 per acre in West Virginia to $20,000 per acre in 
Texas.36  Despite the fact that the bonus induces the lessor to execute a 
lease and the lessee is generally under no obligation to develop the property 
so as to provide royalties,37 some lessees have unfortunately offered 
bonuses with little or no intention of tendering such payments, unless it is 
financially prudent to do so. 
Due to the oil industry’s speculative nature, some lessees refuse to 
tender a lease’s bonus if market fluctuations or exploratory drilling render 
the lessor’s property worthless.  For instance, lessors allege that Range 
Resources unjustly speculated about potential market fluctuations and 
refused to pay deferred lease bonuses after market prices suddenly slumped 
in 2010.38  In North Dakota, lessees have refused to tender a bonus’s 
outstanding balance because the lessee failed to find a buyer for the lease 
 
32.  3A SUMMERS OIL & GAS § 31:1 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining that, “[a]s competition among 
lessees became keener, [lessees] instituted the practice of bidding against each other by offering 
the lessor a cash bonus for the lease . . . .). 
33.  Antelope Prod. Co. v. Shrines Hosp. for Crippled Children, 464 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Neb. 
1991). 
34.  Burlew v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 940 N.Y.S.2d 781, 787 (N.Y. 2011). 
35.  Ronald D. Nickum, Negotiating and Drafting a Modern Lease on Behalf of Lessor, 13 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1982). 
36.  See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNCONVENTIONAL GAS SHALES:  
DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY, & POLICY ISSUES, (2009) available at 
http://www fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40894.pdf. 
37.  See generally Kendor P. Jones & Jennifer L. McDowell, Keeping Your Lease Alive in 
Good Times and in Bad, 55 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 23-1, § 23.02 (2009). 
38.  See generally Backwater Props., LLC v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 1:10CV103, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48496 (D. W.Va. May 5, 2011); Valentino v. Range Res.-Appalachia, 
LLC, No. 09-1615, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50692 (D. Pa. May 21, 2010). 
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after market conditions deteriorated.39  More recently, lessees have begun 
testing the Bakken’s outermost peripheries, and Chesapeake Energy 
cancelled multiple leases and refused to tender deferred lease bonuses after 
drilling six exploratory wells in southwestern North Dakota in 2012.40  
Analogously, Chesapeake cancelled hundreds of leases and refused to 
tender deferred lease bonuses after encountering dry exploratory wells in 
northern Michigan.41  Although these examples are atypical within the oil 
industry,42 such examples illustrate that, despite statutory protections, 
lessors still fall victim to unscrupulous lessees who speculate about a 
lease’s profitability by withholding lease bonuses. 
II.  IRISH OIL AND GAS, INCORPORATED V. RIEMER 
In spite of the questionable nature of the lessees’ conduct in these 
situations, the lessors could take some solace in the fact that the lessees 
cancelled the leases so that the lessors could re-lease the properties.43  But 
what happens when a lessee fails to tender a bonus in a timely fashion and 
refuses to discharge the lease?  The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed 
this situation in Irish Oil and Gas, Incorporated v. Riemer.44 
In Irish Oil, the Riemers executed paid-up leases with Irish Oil that 
contained royalty interests and bonuses that were payable within sixty days 
of the leases’ executions.45  Irish Oil failed to pay the bonuses within the 
prescribed time periods,46 and the Riemers re-leased the property to another 
lessee.47  Irish Oil, who later attempted to tender the bonuses,48 sued the 
Riemers for breaching the leases, and the district court concluded that Irish 
Oil’s failure to promptly pay the bonuses constituted a complete failure of 
consideration because reasonable minds could not differ that Irish Oil’s 
failure to timely tender the bonuses constituted a substantial breach of the 
 
39.  Johnson v. Mineral Estate, Inc., 371 N.W.2d 136, 139-40 (N.D. 1985); Nantt v. Puckett 
Energy, Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 656-59 (N.D. 1986). 
40.  Lauren Donovan, Chesapeake Energy Pulling Back, Won’t Honor Lease Agreements, 
BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 7, 2012, available at http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-
regional/chesapeake-energy-pulling-back-won-t-honor-lease-agreements/article_89324038-5214-
11e1-ba31-0019bb2963f4 html. 
41.  Joshua Schneyer & Brian Grow, Energy Giant Hid Behind Shells in “Land Grab,” 
REUTERS, Dec. 28, 2011, http://www reuters.com/article/2011/12/28/us-energy-giant-newspro-
idUSTRE7BR0HS20111228. 
42.  Donovan, supra note 40.  
43.  As will be discussed in forthcoming sections, this ability may be meaningless because 
market conditions may have rendered the lessor’s property worthless. 
44.  2011 ND 22, 794 N.W.2d at 715.   
45.  Irish Oil, ¶ 2, 794 N.W.2d at 716. 
46.  Id. ¶ 4, 794 N.W.2d at 717. 
47.  Id.  
48.  Id. 
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leases.49  Accordingly, the district court excused the Riemers from the 
leases,50 and Irish Oil appealed under the contention that its failure to timely 
tender the bonuses was only a partial failure of consideration.51 
A. MAJORITY’S HOLDING 
The North Dakota Supreme Court refused to find that Irish Oil’s failure 
to timely pay the bonuses constituted a complete failure of consideration as 
a matter of law.52  To do so would tacitly conclude that the leases’ royalty 
interests were immaterial under the leases.53  Such a conclusion would 
contrast a litany of cases finding that the royalty interest was the lease’s 
primary consideration54 and North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-
39.1,55 which provides that prospective royalties are the essence of the 
lease.56  Moreover, the court found that prospective royalties could 
constitute executory consideration,57 irrespective of the uncertainty that no 
royalties may eventuate.58  Accordingly, the district court erred in holding 
that Irish Oil’s failure to tender the bonuses converted an issue of fact into 
one of law because a royalty interest may constitute sufficient 
consideration.59  Because the query of whether a royalty interest constituted 
sufficient consideration remained an issue of fact60 and there was 
insufficient information to determine whether the Riemers ascribed enough 
importance to the royalty interests for such interests to constitute sufficient 
consideration,61 the court remanded the case for further fact-finding.62 
B. CHIEF JUSTICE VANDEWALLE’S DISSENT 
In dissent, Chief Justice VandeWalle, joined by Justice Sandstrom, 
concluded that Irish Oil’s failure to promptly pay the leases’ bonuses 
 
49.  Id. ¶ 9, 794 N.W.2d at 718. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. ¶ 10. 
52.  Id. ¶ 25, 794 N.W.2d at 721-22.  With this conclusion, the court implied that reasonable 
minds could draw multiple inferences from the facts presented in Irish Oil. 
53.  Id. ¶ 24, 794 N.W.2d at 721.  
54.  Id. ¶ 22. 
55.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.1 (2013). 
56.  Irish Oil, ¶ 25, 794 N.W.2d at 721-22.   
57.  Id. ¶ 26, 794 N.W.2d at 722.  “[C]onsideration may be executed or executory in whole 
or in part.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-05-05 (2013). 
58.  Irish Oil, ¶ 26, 794 N.W.2d at 722.   
59.  Id. 
60.  See id. 
61.  Id. ¶ 25, 794 N.W.2d at 721-22.  
62.  Id. 
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constituted a complete failure of consideration as a matter of law.63  The 
Chief Justice opined that reasonable minds could not differ that paying the 
bonuses was a substantial part of Irish Oil’s obligations because the bonuses 
were the inducement in the leases’ executions64 and the fact that Irish Oil 
was under no obligation to develop the Riemers’ property indicated that any 
future royalty was purely speculative.65  Additionally, in a foreshadowing 
of the aforesaid Chesapeake Energy situation,66 the Chief Justice expressed 
his concern that the majority’s holding could allow a lessee to drill on the 
lessor’s property and tender the lease’s bonus only if the drilling results 
made such an action advisable.67  In this instance, the lessee could argue 
that the delinquent bonus was inconsequential because the royalty interest 
constituted sufficient consideration.68  However, if the lessee found the 
lessor’s property unsuitable for production, or if the lessee was unable to 
profitably peddle the lease, the lessee could terminate the lease without 
tendering the bonus, which would relegate lessors to seeking statutorily 
afforded damages while holding a property possessing no speculative 
value.69  Because of these consternating potentialities and the fact that Irish 
Oil’s failure to timely tender the leases’ bonuses constituted a complete 
failure of consideration, the Chief Justice would have affirmed the appeal 
and excused the Riemers from the leases with Irish Oil.70 
III.  IRISH OIL’S AFTERMATH 
Irrespective of whether the court correctly concluded that a failure to 
tender a paid-up lease’s bonus does not necessarily constitute a complete 
failure of consideration, Irish Oil offends public policy in numerous 
respects.  The decision is a disservice to lessors who have fallen victim to 
perfidious lessees because the decision absolves the consequences of 
impermissible speculative conduct.  Moreover, the decision leaves lessors 
to seek inefficient and insufficient forms of legal redress.  The amalgamated 
effect of these issues requires legislative action to protect lessor interests 
from duplicitously speculating lessees. 
 
63.  Id. ¶ 55, 794 N.W.2d at 729-30 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting). 
64.  Id. ¶ 58, 794 N.W.2d at 730 (citing Elsinore Oil Co. v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 40 P.2d 
523, 523–24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935)). 
65.  Id. ¶ 60, 794 N.W.2d at 731.  
66.  See discussion, supra Part I.B. 
67.  Irish Oil, ¶ 62, 794 N.W.2d at 731 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting). 
68.  See id. ¶ 61. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. ¶ 66, 794 N.W.2d at 732. 
              
688 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:679 
A.  LEGAL CORRECTNESS 
Based upon the facts presented by Irish Oil, both the majority and the 
dissent erred in determining whether or how Irish Oil’s failure to timely 
tender the paid-up leases’ bonus payments constituted a complete or partial 
failure of consideration.  Specifically, the majority conflated the concepts of 
primary and sufficient consideration in determining that a royalty interest 
may prevent a failure to tender a paid-up lease’s bonus from constituting a 
complete failure of consideration.  Similarly, the dissent improperly focused 
upon the importance of the bonus as the consideration inducing the lessor’s 
execution of a lease rather than the peculiar role that a bonus plays in 
sustaining a paid-up lease.  These positions should have recognized that, 
without a paid-up lease’s bonus, no sufficient consideration supports a  
paid-up lease because a royalty interest cannot independently constitute 
sufficient consideration.  Consequentially, Irish Oil’s failure to timely 
tender the paid-up leases’ bonuses constituted a complete failure of 
consideration because this breach left no sufficient consideration to support 
the leases.71 
Before proceeding, it must be noted that this article assumes 
consideration is necessary in a lease.  However, as one treatise notes, “[t]he 
question of whether consideration is required for an oil and gas lease has 
been the subject of some dispute” due to disagreement about whether leases 
are contracts or conveyances.72  Where courts construe leases as 
conveyances, no consideration is required; where courts construe leases as 
contracts, consideration is required.73  Precedent implies that North Dakota 
ascribes to the latter of these positions.74  Whether this precedent is correct 
given that “oil, gas and mineral leases are conveyances of interests in real 
property”75 is beyond the scope of this article.  Accordingly, this analysis 
assumes that consideration is necessary for the execution and sustainment 
of a lease. 
 
71.  The forthcoming analysis rests on the court’s apparent assumption that no other type of 
consideration supported the implicated paid-up leases aside from the bonuses and prospective 
royalties. 
72.  PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, 
§ 220 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2013). 
73.  Id. 
74.  See generally AHO v. Maragos, 2000 ND 14, 605 N.W.2d 161 (oral contract to grant 
lease in exchange for dismissal of claims for damages enforced by court). 
75.  Petroleum Exchange v. Poynter, 64 N.W.2d 718, 722 (N.D. 1954). 
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1.  Peculiarity of Paid-Up Leases 
In order to properly contextualize the issue, one must briefly examine 
the role consideration serves in contractual formations.  Under North 
Dakota law, a contract “must impose an obligation upon each of the parties 
to do something or to permit something to be done as consideration for the 
act or promise of the other” because “mutuality of obligation is an essential 
element of a valid contract.”76  “Without this mutuality of obligation, the 
agreement lacks consideration and no enforceable contract has been created.  
Or, if one of the promises leaves a party free to perform or to withdraw 
from the agreement at his own unrestricted pleasure, the promise is deemed 
illusory and it provides no consideration.”77  Accordingly, in order for a 
valid contract to exist, the agreement must bind each contracting party in 
some respect. 
Such principles laid the foundation for the previous discussion 
concerning the roles that various forms of consideration serve in oil and gas 
leases.78  Lessees historically supported a lease with a royalty interest and a 
covenant to develop the lessor’s property within a specific time frame;79 
since the lessee was obligated to develop the property, this promise 
constituted sufficient consideration.80  Lessees generally contract around 
this obligation by using drilling-delay rental clauses, which discharge any 
covenant of development by requiring the lessee to pay delay rentals if 
drilling has yet to occur on the property.81  Although these delay rentals are 
typically nominal, the rentals constitute consideration because the lessee is 
bound to pay the rental payments where the lessee chooses not to develop 
the leased property. 
Because the delay rentals effectively supplant the role typically served 
by covenants of development, such payments are critical in determining 
whether sufficient consideration, and thereby mutual obligation, exists in a 
lease.  Where lessees employ a drilling-delay rental clause, the lease must 
obligate the lessee to pay the delay rentals because courts have invalidated 
leases that do not require the lessee to produce minerals or make payments 
in lieu of production.82  The lack of mutuality in leases solely supported by 
 
76.  Stewart Equip. Co. v. Hilling Const. Co, 175 N.W.2d 692, 696 (N.D. 1970). 
77.  Mattei v. Hooper, 330 P.2d 625, 626 (Cal. 1958). 
78.  See discussion supra Part I.A. 
79.  58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 280 (2009). 
80.  Id. 
81.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (9th ed. 2009). 
82.  ICG Natural Res. LLC v. BPI Energy, Inc., 926 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ill. Ct. App. 2010) 
(explaining that “[w]e recognize and adhere to the long-standing precedent in Illinois that royalty 
leases are void.”).  
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a promise to pay royalties if the lessee chooses to develop the lessor’s 
property, which courts have dubbed “royalty leases,”83 mandates that courts 
invalidate the lease because such leases “would allow the lessee to do 
absolutely nothing with the leases” while the lessor remained bound by the 
lease.84  If courts were to do otherwise, the lessor’s “hands would be tied up 
so that he could not engage in other enterprises of a permanent character, 
but must ever stand with his hands folded, awaiting the pleasure of [the 
lessee].  In such a contract as this[,] there is neither reciprocity, fairness[,] 
nor good conscience.”85  Thus, where the lease imposes no obligation to 
develop the lessor’s property, the delay rentals are pivotal in maintaining 
the lease because such payments provide mutuality of obligation to the 
lease. 
Based upon these principles, the royalty interest is largely 
inconsequential in determining whether sufficient consideration supports a 
lease.  This immateriality emanates from the fact that any royalty payment 
will come to fruition only where the lessee chooses to develop the property.  
In this respect, it is immaterial that the royalties constitute the primary 
inducement for the lessor’s execution of the lease86 because the decision as 
to whether to develop the property is otherwise solely within the lessee’s 
prerogative.  As outlined above, this is precisely the type of illusory 
promise that cannot constitute sufficient consideration because such a 
promise “leaves a party free to perform [under] the agreement at his own 
unrestricted pleasure.”87  As one court succinctly stated, if the consideration 
“to be paid the lessor depends upon the profit to result from the 
development . . .  and the lessee is not bound, either expressly or impliedly, 
to explore and discover, or, when discovered, to work such mine, then no 
consideration for the lease exists.”88  Accordingly, where the lessee is under 
no obligation to develop the lessor’s property, the royalty interest cannot 
 
83.  Id. at 450. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Lear v. Choteau, 23 Ill. 39 (Ill. 1859). 
86.  Cheyenne Mining and Uranium Co. v. Fed. Res. Corp., 694 P.2d 65, 74 (Wyo. 1985) 
(explaining that the primary consideration in [an oil and gas lease] is the royalty derived from the 
development of the resources). 
87.  Mattei v. Hooper, 330 P.2d 625, 626 (Cal. 1958). 
88.  Petroleum Co. v. Cole, Coke & Mfg. Co, 18 S.W. 65, 66 (Tenn. 1890). In this respect, 
the majority may have also been misguided in its conclusion that a royalty interest without a 
covenant of development may constitute executory consideration pursuant to N.D. CENT. CODE  
§ 9-05-05.  A promise, act, or forbearance constitutes executory consideration only where the 
party is under an affirmative obligation to tender such consideration.  See Blarin Eng’g Co. v. 
Page Steel & Wire Co., 288 F. 662, 664 (3d Cir. 1923).  Since the drilling-delay rental clause 
imposes no covenant of development, the royalty interest cannot constitute executory 
consideration because the lack of a covenant of development means that the lessee is not obligated 
to tender such consideration. 
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constitute sufficient consideration because the contract suffers from a want 
of mutual obligation.  As outlined above, lessees typically provide this 
mutual obligation by using delay rentals to contract around any covenant to 
develop the lessor’s property. 
The principles associated with these delay rentals have a peculiar 
application within “paid-up leases.”  With paid-up leases, the lessee pays all 
of the delay rentals that the lessee would otherwise pay throughout the 
lease’s primary term in one consolidated payment that “is included as a part 
of the bonus tendered to the lessor upon execution of the lease.”89  
Consequentially, the “bonus payment, not rentals, maintains [a paid-up] 
lease during the primary term” where there lessee is under no covenant of 
development.90  Where the lessee refuses to pay the paid-up lease’s bonus, 
the lessee also refuses to tender the lease’s delay rentals, which leaves a 
royalty interest supporting the lease through the lease’s primary term.  
However, this royalty interest is unaccompanied by any obligation to 
develop the lessor’s property because the inclusion of a drilling-delay rental 
clause expressly disclaims any such obligation, thereby preventing the 
judicial imposition of any type of implied covenant of development.91 
Based upon these principles, a failure to pay paid-up lease’s bonus 
payment would leave no other sufficient consideration supporting the lease 
because, as seen above, a royalty interest cannot solely support a lease 
without any other form of consideration.  Since a partial failure of 
consideration occurs only where a breach of contract leaves other sufficient 
consideration to support the lease,92 the failure to tender a paid-up lease’s 
bonus payment constitutes a complete failure of consideration because no 
consideration exists where a lease is solely supported by a royalty interest 
and the lessee is not bound, whether implicitly or explicitly, to develop the 
lessor’s property.  Thus, the bonus is of the utmost importance in paid-up 
leases because the bonus is necessary to sustain a lease without a covenant 
of development. 
 
89.  6 MS PRAC. ENCYCLOPEDIA MS LAW § 53:8 (emphasis added). 
90.  EnerQuest Oil & Gas, LLC, v. Plains Exploration & Prod. Co., No. SA:12-CV-542-
DAE, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 5951952 at 21 (D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2013). 
91.  Bodcaw Oil Co. v. Atl. Ref. Co., 228 S.W.2d 626, 634 (Ark. 1950).  In order to avoid 
terminating such leases due to a want of consideration, courts read implied covenants of 
development into leases that solely supported by a promise to pay a royalty interest if the lessee 
chooses to develop the property.  See W.M. Moldoff, Annotation, Implied Obligation of 
Purchaser or Lessee to Conduct Search for, or to Develop of Work Premises for, Minerals Other 
than Oil and Gas, 76 A.L.R.2d 721 (1961).  Where the court finds this implied covenant, the 
covenant “must be performed in order to keep such a lease in existence and to avoid its 
forfeiture.”  Manfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 133 S.W. 837, 839 (Ark. 1911). 
92.  See Check Control, Inc. v. Shepherd, 462 N.W.2d 644, 647 (N.D. 1990). 
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2.  Majority’s Position 
With this conclusion in mind, one can begin to see how the legal 
principles underlying the majority’s position in Irish Oil begin to falter.  
From the outset, it is imperative to note that Irish Oil concerned paid-up 
leases that contained no covenant of development93 or “unless” clauses.94  
As such, Irish Oil exchanged delay rentals to disclaim any covenant, 
whether expressed or implied, to develop the Riemers’ property.  However, 
because the implicated leases were paid-up leases, all of the delay rentals 
that Irish Oil used to contract around the obligation to develop the Riemers’ 
property were subsumed within the leases’ bonuses.  Accordingly, in 
addition to failing to pay the leases’ bonuses, Irish Oil failed to tender the 
leases’ delay rentals when Irish Oil failed to tender the leases’ bonuses, 
which left the royalty interest, without any obligation to develop the 
Riemers’ property, independently supporting the leases. 
Notwithstanding this realization and the importance of the bonus in 
sustaining a paid-up lease, the Irish Oil majority still found that Irish Oil’s 
failure to timely tender the lease bonuses merely amounted to a partial 
failure of consideration.  Such a conclusion may be improper because, as 
noted above, the royalty interest cannot solely support a lease where the 
lessee is under no obligation to develop the property or pay delay rentals 
because the lessee is under no obligation to act under such an 
arrangement.95  After discounting the obligation to pay the bonus after Irish 
Oil breached the lease from the consideration supporting the lease, Irish 
Oil’s lease with the Riemers effectively became a judicially proscribed 
“royalty lease” in the sense that the only way Irish Oil was bound to act 
under the lease was to pay royalties if Irish Oil chose to develop the 
 
93.  See Irish Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 22, 794 N.W.2d 715, 721 (The 
implicated leases were “‘Paid–Up Lease(s)’ which provide the lessee has no obligation to 
commence operations during the primary term . . . .”) (alteration in original). 
94.  “The leases in Irish Oil did not contain ‘unless’ clauses . . . .”  Beaudoin v. JB Mineral 
Services, LLC, 2011 ND 229, ¶ 12, 808 N.W.2d 672, 674.  The lack of the unless clause is crucial 
because: 
[w]here a lease contains a recital of an initial cash consideration, even though the 
amount is nominal, but provides that if the lessee does not drill within the time named, 
the lease will be void, unless the lessee pays a stipulated sum in advance for its further 
continuance (the unless drilling clause), then, although the lessee is under no duty to 
drill or pay, the courts have held that the lease is not void for want of consideration on 
the ground that the nominal initial cash consideration supports the entire lease. 
2 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL & GAS § 13:8 (3d ed. 2013).  Accordingly, if the leases 
contained an unless clause, the forthcoming analysis would be moot because the mere recital of 
nominal consideration would have supported the entire lease. 
95.  See ICG Natural Resources, LLC v. BPI Energy, Inc., 926 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2010) (A lease that provided a royalty interest with no obligation to develop the property of tender 
delay rentals held invalid). 
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Riemers’ property.  This optionality, absent other obligations, is precisely 
why a royalty interest cannot solely support a lease because the Riemers 
remained bound under the lease while Irish Oil’s performance under the 
lease was at its own discretion.  Accordingly, Irish Oil’s failure to tender 
the paid leases’ bonuses amounted to a complete failure of consideration 
because a royalty interest cannot constitute sufficient consideration and a 
partial failure of consideration only occurs where the Irish Oil’s breach of 
the lease left other sufficient consideration to sustain the lease.96  
Therefore, although the royalty interest is the primary consideration in 
leases, the majority erred by underappreciating how crucial a bonus is 
within paid-up leases because the bonus is necessary to sustain a paid-up 
lease.  In this regard, Irish Oil was incorrectly decided. 
3.  Dissent’s Position 
Pursuant to the conclusion that Irish Oil’s failure to tender the paid-up 
leases’ bonus payments constituted a complete failure of consideration, one 
would expect that the dissent correctly resolved Irish Oil.  The dissent 
correctly emphasized that the bonus was material to the disposition of Irish 
Oil because of the uncertainty that any royalties would ever eventuate from 
production.  In this respect, the dissent rightly echoed the forgoing analysis 
to the extent that the uncertainties of potential development of the leased 
property preclude a royalty interest from constituting sufficient 
consideration.  In spite of this realization, the dissent misinterpreted the 
relationship between such uncertainty and the role that the bonus serves 
within the context of paid-up leases. 
Particularly, the dissent erred when it seemingly implied that a lessee’s 
failure to tender a lease’s bonus necessarily constitutes a complete failure of 
consideration.  The dissent argued that the failure to tender the bonus 
constituted a complete failure of consideration because the bonus serves as 
the consideration for the lessor’s execution of the lease.97  Such a 
conclusion is not in and of itself incorrect, but the conclusion is erroneous 
given that the dissent came to the conclusion without once referencing the 
unique role that a bonus plays in a paid-up lease.  As will be seen, merely 
failing to tender the bonus payment does not necessarily constitute a 
complete failure of consideration. 
 
96.  See Check Control, 462 N.W.2d at 647. 
97.  Irish Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶¶ 56-58, 794 N.W.2d 715, 729-30 
(VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting). 
              
694 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:679 
As previously alluded to, lessees typically utilize bonus payments 
where competition amongst lessees so dictates.98  Where this competition is 
absent, it may not be necessary for the lessee to offer a bonus to induce the 
lessor to execute the lease.  Alternatively, a lessor may choose to forgo a 
bonus payment in exchange for a larger royalty interest or other 
consideration.  Moreover, a lease can simply stipulate that the lessee pay the 
lease’s delay rentals on the lease’s anniversary instead of with the bonus, 
which was popular with leases of yesteryear.  In these instances, a lease 
may not even contain a bonus payment,99 which indicates that other 
sufficient consideration otherwise supports the lease.  For instance and as 
described above,100 a royalty interest coupled with either a covenant of 
development or drilling-delay rental clause may constitute sufficient 
consideration because the lessee is bound to act in any eventuality.  This 
mutuality of obligation, which is independent from the bonus payment, 
thusly removes a failure to pay a bonus from a complete failure of 
consideration because, even after discounting the obligation to pay the 
bonus from the lease’s consideration, other sufficient consideration would 
still support the lease after the lessee breached the lease.  The existence of 
this additional consideration would consequentially only entitle the lessor to 
commensurate monetary damages.101 
Pursuant to these hypotheticals, the dissent’s reasoning in regards to 
why Irish Oil’s failure to tender the paid-up leases’ bonuses was improper.  
As indicated above, where the bonus merely serves as consideration for the 
lease’s execution, a failure to pay the bonus would only constitute a partial 
failure of consideration because other sufficient consideration would still 
exist notwithstanding a failure to pay the bonus.  The reason that the failure 
to pay the bonus became of consequence in Irish Oil was because the  
paid-up nature of the leases indicated that bonuses contained the leases’ 
delay rentals.  For if the delay rentals had been parsed out from the bonus 
instead of subsumed within the bonus, Irish Oil’s failure to tender the bonus 
would have been a partial failure of consideration because the delay rentals 
would still have furnished mutuality of obligation to the lease.  
Accordingly, the dissent came to the correct conclusion through the 
fortuitous occurrence of having the implicated leases be paid-up in nature. 
 
98.  See discussion supra Part I.B. 
99.  See Olson v. Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33, 34 (N.D. 1984) (observing that “[t]he sole 
consideration for this lease was either delay rentals or a one-eighth royalty from production.”). 
100.  See discussion supra Part I.B. 
101.  See discussion supra Part I.A. 
              
2013] NOTE 695 
4.  Conclusion 
Based upon this reasoning, both the majority and the dissent incorrectly 
addressed the dispositive facts presented in Irish Oil.  The majority erred by 
implying that a royalty interest may constitute sufficient consideration so 
that a failure to pay a paid-up lease’s bonus would merely constitute a 
partial failure of consideration.  Similarly, the dissent’s focus on the bonus 
as the consideration for the execution of the lease rather than the bonus’s 
imperative role in paid-up leases was misguided because a failure to tender 
a lease’s bonus does not necessarily constitute a complete failure of 
consideration, as the dissent seemingly implied.  These positions should 
have found that, where a lessee fails to tender the paid-up lease’s bonus, 
such failure constitutes a complete failure of consideration because the 
lessee’s failure to tender such a payment is a substantial breach of the lease 
in the sense that such breach leaves no other sufficient consideration to 
support the lease.  Accordingly, both positions underappreciated the role 
that a bonus payment serves in paid-up leases. 
B.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Regardless of whether the foregoing analysis is correct, Irish Oil 
frustrates various policy concerns at the expense of prejudicing 
unsophisticated lessees.  North Dakota must abrogate Irish Oil because the 
decision potentially unsettles lessor-lessee relations and leaves lessors to 
pursue inefficient forms of recourse that cannot account for the potential 
economic cost of the lessee’s conduct.  Placating such concerns is solely 
within the Legislature’s prerogative because the proprieties of the laws 
creating these consternating results are questions for the Legislature.102 
1. Skewing Lessor-Lessee Relations in Favor of the Lessee 
North Dakota must nullify Irish Oil because the decision usurps the 
lessor-lessee relational dichotomy by allowing a lessee to enter a lease 
without assuming the risks typically associated with a lease’s execution.  
North Dakota would be woefully remiss if it allowed recent successes to 
cloud the state’s perception about the oil industry’s stability.  As the state 
knows all too well from good times gone bust,103 the oil industry is highly 
speculative104 because the industry is subject to the ebbs and flows of 
 
102.  See Mont.-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414, 420 (N.D. 1967).   
103.  See Anderson, supra note 4, at 719-20. 
104.  Moerman v. Prairie Rose Res., Inc. 308 P.3d 75, 79 (Mont. 2013). 
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numerous forces,105 the amalgam of which leaves market conditions in a 
seemingly perpetual state of oscillation.106  Due to this constant state of flux 
and the fact a lease commits both of the leasing parties to a long-term 
obligation containing a fixed valuation,107 both of the leasing parties assume 
a great deal of potential risk and reward in leasing. 
Following the lease’s execution, the lessor and lessee maintain an 
inverse relationship regarding the lease’s fair market value because the 
parties assume the risk that one party will benefit from market fluctuations 
at the other’s expense.  In such a relationship, the lessor assumes the risk 
that the property’s value will appreciate so that the property is more 
valuable than what the parties originally anticipated.108  Conversely, the 
lessee assumes the risk that the property’s value will depreciate so that the 
property is less valuable than what the parties originally anticipated.  
Accordingly, in any eventuality, market fluctuations will benefit one party 
while prejudicing the other because either the lessor will have leased the 
property for less than the property’s current worth or the lessee will have 
leased the property for more than the property’s current worth. 
In entering the lease and assuming such risks, the lessee may speculate 
about how market fluctuations may affect the lease’s value so long as the 
lessee is in compliance with the lease’s terms and covenants.109  Regardless 
of its unsavory connotations, speculation is a necessity in the oil industry 
because the industry’s volatility implicitly imputes some level of 
speculation into most oil contracts.110  Moreover, speculation is generally 
an integral component of properly allocating resources because speculation 
regulates market conditions111 and encourages timely and orderly 
 
105.  As one commentator concluded, “[i]t is the long delay between an increase in demand 
for oil and gas, an increase in production and exploration activity, and an expansion of the whole 
supply chain, which explain the deep cyclicality of the petroleum industry and mining.”  John 




106.  See Tim McMahon, Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table), INFLATIONDATA.COM, 
http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp. 
107.  Gary Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of Oil and Gas Law, 
33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 718 (1994). 
108.  Id.  
109.  This type of speculation before entering the lease permissible, as sharply contrasted 
from speculation after entering the lease.   
110.  See Sinclair Prarie Oil Co. v. Worcester, 205 P.2d 942, 943 (Kan. 1949) (rejecting the 
argument that an oil and gas contract of a speculative nature should be struck down as an unlawful 
gambling contract because to do so, the court “would have to strike down half the contracts in the 
oil business.”). 
111.  See Conine, supra note 107, at 718. 
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development.112  In spite of speculation’s efficacy and necessity in these 
regards, courts widely condemn the speculative holding of leases,113 
especially in instances concerning certain speculative acts. 
With the recognition that protecting lessor interests is of the paramount 
importance,114 a lessee may not “speculate with the assets of another 
without the payment of any consideration.”115  Courts predicate this concise 
aphorism upon the fact that it would be wholly inequitable to allow a lessee 
to speculatively lease a property through no expenditure because such an 
arrangement exposes the lessee to no risk and allows the lessee to reap the 
lease’s rewards.116  Pursuant to this principle, lessees may not hold a lease 
for speculative purposes except in strict compliance with the lease and for 
consideration other than prospective royalties.117  Equity demands 
termination of the lease where no such consideration exists118 or where such 
other consideration is delinquent because judicial termination will inflict no 
injustice119 and lessors deserve more protections than simply the right to sue 
for delinquent consideration.120 
Irish Oil contravenes these principles in numerous respects.  The 
decision unjustly allows a lessee to refrain from tendering the bonus until it 
is economically judicious to do so under the pretense that such a 
delinquency was inconsequential because the royalty interest constituted 
sufficient consideration; if these market conditions never come to fruition, 
the lessee can dishonor the lease without the loss of the lease’s required 
bonus.  Such an unpalatable result that clemencies the untimely tendering of 
a lease’s bonus in favor of lessees only exacerbates the lessee’s decided 
 
112.  Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More is Not Always Better Than Less:  An Exploration in 
Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 694 (2008). 
113.  Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934, 936 (Okla. 1943). 
114.  Moerman v. Prairie Rose Res., Inc., 308 P.2d 75, 79 (Mont. 2013) (quoting Stanolind 
Oil & Gas, Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F.2d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1938)). 
115.  See Boyer v. Tucker & Baumgardner Corp., 372 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1985) (rejecting a lease interpretation that would have allowed such a result). 
116.  See generally id. 
117.  Rice v. Lee, 113 P.2d 235, 236-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941). 
118.  Hall v. Augur, 256 P. 232, 234-235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927) (explaining that a lessor 
cannot omit to drill and develop and hold the grant for speculative purposes purely when no other 
consideration supports the lease). 
119.  Alford v. Dennis, 170 P. 1005, 1007 (1918) (stating “[u]nless the defendants had a 
bona fide intention to prospect and develop this tract they had no proper purpose in leasing it, and 
to cancel the lease will do them no injury.”). 
120.  Boyer v. Tucker & Baumgardner Corp., 372 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) 
(explaining “[since the oil industry] is so highly speculative, plaintiffs deserve more . . . protection 
than merely the right to sue on an obligation.”) (emphasis added). 
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advantages in sophistication and bargaining power121 by allowing the lessee 
to lease with little to no risk while the lessor still assumes the risks 
otherwise associated with the lease’s execution.  One can hardly argue that 
such a result comports with the Legislature’s previous efforts in other 
contexts of trying to “equalize the bargaining power of the landowners 
when dealing with major oil companies”122 because Irish Oil may allow 
lessees to speculate with the lessor’s assets without the paying of any 
consideration, which other courts resoundingly condemn.123  These 
unnerving potentialities stand starkly in contrast to the adage that lessor 
interests must remain of the utmost importance,124 and Irish Oil is 
unfortunately anything but a singular judicial aberration. 
As Irish Oil and numerous other analogous cases indicate, legal 
technicalities have prevented courts from adequately protecting lessors from 
the unsavory conduct of much more sophisticated lessees.125  Because the 
proprieties of the laws creating these technicalities are policy questions for 
the Legislature,126 North Dakota must act to protect lessor interests by 
requiring the timely tendering of lease bonuses.  And time is of the essence 
in doing as much because lessees have already attempted to use Irish Oil to 
excuse delinquent bonuses at a lessor’s expense.127 
2.  Lessor’s Lack of Efficient Legal Recourse 
North Dakota must also amend its statutory scheme to require the 
timely tendering of lease bonuses because the state’s existing statutory 
scheme relegates lessors to pursuing inefficient forms of recourse that 
cannot account for the true economic cost of the lessee’s conduct.  When 
considering this fleecing, one must note that the lessor loses both the bonus 
and the correlative rights associated with owning a sought after property 
when a lessee refuses to tender a lease’s bonus, including the ability to 
 
121.  See J. Zach Burt, Playing the “Wild Card” in the High-Stakes Game of Urban 
Development:  Unconscionability in the Early Barnett Shale Leases, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 
1, 13 (2008). 
122.  LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, at 42 (N.D. 1961). 
123.  See Boyer, 372 N.W.2d at 556. 
124.  Stanolind Oil & Gas, Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F.2d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1938). 
125.  For instance, other courts have excused a delinquent bonus under the reasoning that 
time is not necessarily of the essence in leases.  See generally Linder v. SWEPI LP, No. 1:11-CV-
1579, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20827 (D. Pa. February 11, 2013); Standefer v. T. S. Dudley Land 
Co., No. 3:09-CV-1115, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132267, 22 (D. Pa. July 14, 2010). 
126.  Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414, 420 (N.D. 1967). 
127.  “JB first contends the July 2009 lease is valid because a royalty clause alone is 
sufficient consideration for an oil and gas lease under [Irish Oil.]”  Beaudoin v. JB Mineral Servs., 
LLC, 2011 ND 229, ¶ 8, 808 N.W.2d 671, 673. 
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make other arrangements for developing the leased property.128  In order to 
rectify this situation through termination of the lease, a lessor must engage 
in laborious and time-consuming termination efforts. 
North Dakota currently provides lessors with two options in attempting 
to terminate a lease.  North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-36 provides 
lessors with a set of procedures to terminate a lease without judicial 
intervention if the lessee forfeits the lease pursuant to the lease’s terms and 
the lessee fails to object to the lessor’s termination efforts.129  If 
unsuccessful under this section because of the lessee’s refusal to terminate 
the lease, a lessor may seek judicial termination of the lease pursuant to 
North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-37,130 which allows a prevailing 
lessor to terminate the lease, recover associated litigation expenses, one 
hundred dollars in damages, and “any additional damages that the evidence 
in the case will warrant.”131  Despite the affordance of such remedies, these 
provisions are inefficient and insufficient for lessors. 
This existing statutory scheme is inefficient as applied to lease disputes 
because time is of the essence in leases.132  Although North Dakota Century 
Code section 47-16-36 allows lessors to engage in a form of self-help 
termination, the statute still requires the lessor to spend several weeks 
trying to terminate the lease, and such an effort will be successful only in 
the highly improbable event that the lessee fails to contest the lease’s 
termination.  Only then may lessors begin the protracted and uncertain 
process of seeking judicial termination of the lease that could take years to 
complete.133  Even if the lessor prevailed in either of these regards by 
terminating the lease, market conditions may have rendered the lessor’s 
property worthless in the interim, and this statutory languidness forces the 
lessor to assume a great deal of economic loss. 
In ascertaining these remedies’ deficiencies, one must recognize “the 
measure of damages for breach of contract is the same for oil and gas leases 
 
128.  See generally Lear v. Choteau, 23 Ill. 39 (1859). 
129.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (2001). 
130.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-37 (1957). 
131.  Id.  It should be noted that regular contractual damages may not be applicable in such 
instances because N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-37 provides a specific remedy for this specific 
instance and contractual damages are applicable “except when otherwise expressly provided by 
the laws of this state.”  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-09 (1943). 
132.  Amber Oil and Gas Co. v. Bratton, 711 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. App. 1986). 
133.  Courts in western North Dakota are notoriously backlogged because of the oil boom. 
See Claire Zillman, Bakken Boom Creating Constitutional Crisis for North Dakota Courts, AM. 
LAW. DAILY, Aug. 21, 2012, available at 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202568269279/Bakken-Boom-Creating-Constitutional-
Crisis-for-North-Dakota-Courts.  
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as it is for other contracts.”134  North Dakota limits contractual damages to 
the amount that will compensate an aggrieved party for the damages 
proximately caused by the other party,135 and courts cannot award damages 
that put the aggrieved party in a better position than if the breaching party 
fully performed under the contract.136  Based upon these principles, the 
lessor would be able to recover the withheld bonus because the bonus is 
payable under all circumstances.137  However, the lessor would be unable to 
recoup other, much more substantial damages. 
Unfortunately, by executing a lease, the lessor foregoes the royalties 
that may have accrued if another lessee would have developed the lessor’s 
property where the original lessee refrained from doing so and the lessor 
also assumes the risk that market fluctuations may render the lessor’s 
property worthless before the lessor can re-lease the property.  Normally, 
where the lessee is under an obligation to develop the lessor’s property and 
fails to do so, the appropriate damage award “is the amount of royalties that 
the lessor lost by reason of the lessee’s breach,”138 and courts may also 
award damages that represent “the loss in leasing value of the plaintiff’s 
land resulting from the failure to drill.”139  However, as previously 
discussed, the vast majority of modern leases impose no such obligation.140  
Lessors would accordingly be unable to collect damages for foregone 
royalties that may have accrued if another lessee developed the property 
because the lessee could fully perform under the contract without providing 
such royalties.  Similarly, the lessor would be unable to recover for the 
property’s devaluation because market fluctuations caused the depreciation, 
not the lessee’s conduct.141  Accordingly, lessors could only collect lease 
bonuses after market conditions rendered the lessor’s property worthless, 
surely to the chagrin of lessors who sustained significant damages in 
entering a lease with a lessee who was solely trying to further its own 
interests by withholding the lease’s bonus. 
Lessors are sure to be similarly disappointed in trying to recoup 
damages pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-37’s “any 
additional damages that the evidence in the case will warrant” clause, which 
 
134.  3 SUMMERS OIL & GAS (3d ed. 2012). 
135.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-09 (1943). 
136.  Leingang v. Mandan Weed Bd., 468 N.W.2d 397, 398 (N.D. 1991).   
137.  See Johnson v. Mineral Estate, Inc., 371 N.W.2d 136, 139-40 (N.D. 1985).   
138.  38 AM. JUR. 2d Gas & Oil § 303 (1968).   
139.  3 SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 23:8 (3d ed. 2012). 
140.  See Jones & McDowell, supra note 36 at § 23.02. 
141.  In North Dakota, “damages must flow directly and naturally from the breach of 
contract.”  Vallejo v. Jamestown Coll., 244 N.W.2d 753, 758 (N.D. 1976). 
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North Dakota courts have yet to interpret or apply.142  Other comparable 
statutes143 only afford damages that proximately emanate from the lessee’s 
failure to cancel the lease,144 which are to be calculated based upon the 
difference of the lease’s fair market value at the time the lessee should have 
terminated the lease because of a contractual breach and such value at the 
time of trial.145  Despite this affordance, the statute still might not make the 
lessor whole because the lessor would be unable to collect damages for 
devaluations that occurred while the lessee speculatively withheld the 
lease’s bonus during a protracted deferral period,146 as the lessee would 
technically be in compliance with the lease.147  Such a limitation is 
significant because market conditions may have rendered the lessor’s 
property worthless during the deferral period so that the difference in the 
lease’s fair market value148 at the time the lessee should have terminated the 
lease and that at the time of trial may be nominal.  Thus, even though North 
Dakota Century Code section 47-16-37 may provide additional damages, 
lessors might still sustain significant losses in dealing with impermissibly 
speculating lessees.149 
Because the law cannot make lessors whole in their dealings with 
speculating lessees, North Dakota’s statutory scheme is inadequate to 
 
142.  See Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Reimer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 61, 794 N.W.2d 715, 731 
(VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that “[i]t remains to be determined whether [N.D. Cent. 
Code § 47-16-37] will allow the recovery of the destruction of the value of the mineral estate 
proven worthless while the lessee holds a lease for which the lessee has not paid the agreed-upon 
bonus.”). 
143.  See MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 82-1-201 to 82-1-204.  For other examples, see 3 SUMMERS 
OIL & GAS § 19:11 (3d ed. 2012). 
144.  Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 225 P. 612, 614 (Mont. 1924).  Such damages 
cannot be used to allow the lessor “to recover more than they were actually damaged.”  Reaugh v. 
McCollum Exploration Co., 163 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1942).  Moreover, the lessee is not liable 
for a failure to discharge the lease if the lessee in good faith believed the lease to be valid.  3 
SUMMERS OIL& GAS § 19:10 (3d ed. 2012). 
145.  Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 246 P. 168, 177 (Mont. 1926).   
146.  Leases will typically defer the lessee’s obligation to tender the lease’s bonus for a 
specific period of time.  For instance, the leases implicated in Irish Oil contained a sixty-day 
deferral period.  However, other leases have deferral periods of up to one hundred and eighty 
days.  See Linder v. SWEPI LP, No. 1:11-CV-1579, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20827 (D. Pa. 
February 11, 2013). 
147.  In this respect, this situation is analogous to that seen in the aforementioned Range 
Resources situation.  See discussion, supra Part I.B. 
148.  In North Dakota, fair market value is “the price a buyer is willing to pay and the seller 
is willing to accept under circumstances that do not amount to coercion.”  Mike Golden, Inc. v. 
Tenneco Oil Co., 450 N.W.2d 716, 719 (N.D. 1990) (quoting Connell v. Sun Exploration & Prod. 
Co., 655 P.2d 426, 428 (Colo. App. 1982)).  In this determination, fair market value is to be 
determined based upon:  “(1) analysis of comparable sales or market data; (2) analysis of the cost 
of replacement less depreciation; and (3) an income or economic analysis.”  Id. 
149.  It should be noted that lessors might be able to collect exemplary damages in such 
instances so as to deter similar conduct in the future if the lessor can prove fraud or malice.  See 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (2009). 
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properly protect lessors.  As one court observed about the oil industry, 
“[p]erhaps in no other business is prompt performance of contracts so 
essential to the rights of the parties, or delay by one party likely to prove so 
injurious to the other.”150  In this regard, North Dakota’s laws only 
exacerbate the lessor’s plight by forcing the lessor to engage in protracted 
termination processes that prevent the lessors from making other 
arrangements for the property.  This inability to re-lease the property 
because of the pending litigation only further inflicts damages that the law 
cannot rectify by exposing the lessor to the risk that market conditions may 
render the property worthless during the litigation.  Accordingly, North 
Dakota must amend the state’s lethargic laws so as to allow the lessor to 
expeditiously re-lease the property.  To do otherwise leaves lessors in the 
unenviable position of assuming irreparable harm and allowing lessees to 
walk away from a lease with minimal loss. 
IV.   PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE FIX: STATUTORILY REQUIRED 
TIMELY TENDERING OF BONUS PAYMENTS 
The amalgam of these policy concerns indicates that North Dakota 
needs to take some action to protect the lessor’s interest in a lease’s bonus.  
The question then becomes how the state can properly effectuate this end.  
In resolving this determination, North Dakota can fashion an effective 
statute by considering the few existing statutes that concern the timely 
tendering of lease bonuses. 
As of the beginning of 2014, only two states have promulgated statutes 
governing the paying of bonuses in oil and gas leases, and both statutes 
leave much to be desired.  A New York statute voids any lease if a lessee 
fails to tender a lease’s bonus within one hundred and eighty days of the 
lease’s execution.151  Although this statute properly invalidates a lease 
where the lessee fails to timely tender the bonus, the statute is undesirable 
because time is of the essence in leases and a one hundred and eight day 
deferral period is exceedingly long.  Additionally, a North Carolina statute 
imposes a 10% interest rate penalty on all bonuses that remain unpaid after 
sixty day following the lease’s execution.152  This statute is undesirable 
because a 10% interest rate is a relatively nominal penalty153 and lessors 
cannot invalidate the leases.  Despite these statutory shortcomings, North 
 
150.  Munroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. 307, 311 (Pa. 1880) (emphasis added). 
151.  N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-333(2) (McKinney 2006). 
152.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-423(d) (2012). 
153.  For instance, North Dakota imposes an 18% interest rate penalty on all oil and gas 
royalties that are outstanding following one hundred and fifty days after production.  See N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.1 (2011). 
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Dakota can adopt a statute that properly protects lessor interests and 
rectifies these issue laden statutes. 
In recognizing the need to revise the state’s laws to accommodate an 
influx of oil and gas development, North Carolina considered various 
legislative proposals concerning how to ensure the timely tendering of lease 
bonuses.  One of these proposals stipulated that North Carolina should 
adopt a statute that automatically terminates a lease, without the need for 
judicial intervention, if the lessee fails to tender the lease’s bonus within 
thirty days of the lease’s execution, the lessor notifies the lessee, in writing, 
of such a delinquency, and the lessee fails to rectify the situation within 
fifteen days.154  North Dakota should adopt this proposal so as to forestall 
Irish Oil’s operation for the forthcoming reasons. 
A. PROPERLY EFFECTUATING POLICY CONCERNS 
Although North Carolina refrained from codifying this proposal, the 
proposal provides the best framework for North Dakota’s statute.  With its 
emphasis on expeditiousness and strident penalties, this proposal is much 
more preferable than the North Carolina and New York statutes.  This 
proposal also ensures that the lessee assumes an appropriate amount of risk 
in a lease’s execution, and the proposal’s automatic termination of the lease 
increases the efficiency of the lessor’s legal recourse so as to minimize the 
infliction of legally irreparable harm.  Additionally, the proposal in no way 
unduly prejudices lessees because the proposal simply codifies long-
standing legal principles and leasing practices that sophisticated lessors 
have used to protect their interests.  In short, this proposal advances all of 
the implicated policy issues and rectifies the deficiencies seen in existing 
statutes while causing lessees only minimal inconvenience. 
North Dakota should adopt the North Carolina proposal because such a 
proposal properly remedies the New York and North Carolina statutes’ 
faults.  The proposal is preferable to the North Carolina statute because the 
statute terminates the lease instead of imposing a potentially trivial penalty, 
which drastically increases the lessee’s incentive to hastily tender a lease’s 
bonus.  Moreover, the proposal is superior to New York’s statute because, 
by allowing the lessor to promptly re-lease the property instead of waiting 
one hundred and eighty days, the proposal’s short deferral period helps 
protect lessors from drastic market fluctuations in the interim.  The 
proposal’s superiority in these respects is also keenly tailored to further the 
policy concerns frustrated by Irish Oil. 
 
154.  N.C. Dep’t of Justice Consumer Protect. Div., North Carolina Oil and Gas Study under 
Session Law 2011-276:  Impact on Landowners and Consumer Protection Issues 42 (2012). 
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By automatically terminating the lease, the proposal allows the lessor 
to expeditiously re-lease the property before potential market changes may 
render the lessor’s property worthless.  This new lease would allow the 
lessor to enjoy an additional bonus that the lessor might not be able to 
collect if market conditions render the lessor’s property worthless before the 
lessor can re-lease the property.  The new lease would also allow the new 
lessee to develop the property under prevailing market conditions.  In this 
regard, the proposal potentially allows the lessor to enjoy royalties that the 
lessor might have to otherwise injuriously forego because a change in 
market conditions might render such development uneconomical by the 
time the lessor can re-lease the property.  Thus, the proposal imperatively 
expedites the lessor’s recourse so as to minimize the infliction of legally 
incurable damages because the proposal allows lessors to circumvent 
protracted and uncertain termination processes. 
Additionally, by requiring the timely tendering of a bonus under the 
threat of termination, the proposal ensures that the lessee assumes an 
appropriate amount of risk in the lease’s execution.  The required tendering 
of lease bonuses mandates that the lessee assume the risk that market 
conditions may render the leased property worthless so that the lessee loses 
the already paid bonus.  The proposal accordingly furthers the Legislature’s 
previously stated desire of trying to equalize lessor-lessee relations in other 
contexts155 by ensuring that both the lessor and the lessee assume risk in the 
lease’s execution.  In doing so, the proposal prevents lessees from 
speculating with the lessor’s assets without exchanging any consideration 
because the lessee must tender the bonus if the lessee wishes to hold the 
lease in anticipation of market changes.156  Thus, the proposal properly 
forecloses the threat that Irish Oil could allow lessees to validate a lease 
while speculatively withholding the lease’s bonus,157 and the proposal 
achieves this end in a way that causes lessees minimal vexation. 
In mandating the timely tendering of lease bonuses, this proposal is a 
tepid imposition on lessees.  The proposal merely codifies the Legislature’s 
possible assumption that a lease would not become operative without the 
lessee’s tendering of the bonus.158  Moreover, the proposal does nothing 
more than codify the well-accepted canon that time is of the essence in 
 
155.  LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, at 42 (N.D. 1961). 
156.  In this respect the proposal furthers North Dakota’s policy of fostering and encouraging 
the development of the state’s resources promulgated in N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-01 (1981) by 
ensuring that only those lessees who are serious enough about developing the lessor’s property to 
invest a bonus are able to hold the property for extended times. 
157.  See supra Part II.A. 
158.  Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 64, 794 N.W.2d 715, 732 (VandeWalle, 
C.J., dissenting).  
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leases159 so that a lessee’s failure to tender the bonus within the prescribed 
time period precludes the lessee from asserting any rights under the lease.160  
Such an imposition is consistent with how legislatures have protected 
lessors because states have already gone so far as to statutory impose Pugh 
clauses161 and minimal royalty interests162 into leases.  Although such 
protection may cause lessees some mild trepidation,163 the proposal 
adequately protects lessees who make a sincere mistake about failing to 
tender the lease’s bonus because the proposal requires that the lessor notify 
the lessee of the delinquent bonus and affords the lessee fifteen additional 
days to tender the bonus before the lease terminates.  In short, this proposal 
is merely a modest protectionist measure designed to protect lessors, 
specifically unsophisticated lessors. 
Sophisticated lessors, usually with the attorney assistance, have already 
recognized the efficacy of including provisions similar to this proposal.  For 
instance, seasoned lessors have included language to the effect that the 
implicated lease shall be null and void unless the bonus consideration is 
paid by a specified date.164  However, lay lessors will most likely be unable 
to appreciate how the failure to include a similar provision can cause a 
situation like that found in Irish Oil.  Rather, the prospect of newfound 
wealth often causes unsophisticated lessors to overlook that lessees are 
trying to further their own interests in negotiating leases.165  Such a 
realization provides further fodder for codifying this proposal because the 
proposal properly protects the most vulnerable lessors, as indicated by the 
proposal’s potential applications. 
One can immediately recognize the proposal’s virtue by applying it to 
the aforementioned instances of questionable lessee conduct.166  The 
proposal would have prevented Range Resources from terminating leases 
without the loss of previously paid bonuses by requiring the full tendering 
 
159.  Amber Oil & Gas Co. v. Bratton, 711 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). 
160.  E.E.E., Inc. v. Hanson, 318 N.W.2d 101, 104 (N.D. 1982). 
161.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-09.8 (1983); ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-73-201(a) (2011); 
OKLA. STAT. TIT. 52, § 87.1(b) (2012). 
162.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-423(c) (2012) (“Any lease of oil or gas rights . . . shall provide 
that the lessor shall receive a royalty payment of not less than twelve and one-half percent 
(12.5%) . . . .”). 
163.  One can certainly argue that this proposal is unduly burdensome on lessees because the 
shortened deferral period may be insufficient time for the lessee to conduct a title search and cure 
any potential defects.  Given that protecting lessors is of the utmost importance, such an argument 
is unavailing because the proposal may simply require that the lessees complete these and other 
tasks before entering the lease with the lessor. 
164.  Johnson v. Mineral Estate, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 778, 779 (N.D. 1984).   
165.  See Joshua A. Swanson, The Fine Print Matters:  Negotiating Oil and Gas Leases in 
North Dakota, 87 N.D. L. REV. 703, 706 (2012). 
166.  See discussion, supra Part I.B. 
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of the lease bonuses within a reasonable time frame; if Range Resources 
refused to do so, the leases would have terminated, and the lessors could 
have re-leased the property before market conditions deteriorated.  The 
proposal also would have terminated the leases with Chesapeake Energy 
before drilling results presumably rendered the implicated area worthless, 
which would have allowed the lessors to gain the benefits of another lease 
before the new lessee found the implicated area unsuitable for production.  
Furthermore, by requiring the full tendering of a lease’s bonus within the 
specific time frame, the proposal prevents lessees from refusing to tender a 
bonus’s outstanding balance after the lessee fails to find a buyer for the 
lease.  Finally, the proposal would have prevented Irish Oil from validating 
its lease with the Riemers after failing to tender the leases’ bonuses because 
the proposal would have automatically terminated the leases if the Riemers 
complied with the proposal’s various requirements.  Thus, the proposal will 
duly protect lessor interests by preventing similar situations in the future. 
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE FIX 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, North Dakota should adopt the 
following proposal:  In order to protect lessor interests through mandating 
the prompt, full payment of all lease bonuses and to prevent impermissible 
speculation on the part of lessees, an oil and gas lease containing a bonus 
shall automatically terminate if the lessee fails to tender the lease’s bonus 
within thirty days of the lease’s execution, the lessor subsequently notifies 
the lessee, in writing, of such a delinquency, and the lessee fails to redress 
the situation within fifteen additional days.167 
V.  CONTRACTING AROUND IRISH OIL IN THE INTERIM 
While Irish Oil persists and the Legislature’s failure to act on Irish Oil 
during the 2013 legislative session constitutes a tacit endorsement of Irish 
Oil’s constructions of law,168 the question that arises is whether lessors can 
contract around Irish Oil.  As previously alluded to,169 lessors can use 
various methods to protect themselves from speculating lessees.  
Specifically, lessors can prevent Irish Oil’s operation by making the timely 
 
167.  This is not intended to be the full extent of the potential statute because the potential 
statute must address issues such as how the written notification is to occur, when and how the 
lessor is to file a satisfaction of the lease with county recorders, and other formalities. 
168.  Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663, 666 (N.D.1995) (The court “presume[s] the 
legislature is aware of judicial construction of a statute, and from its failure to amend a particular 
statutory provision, we may presume it acquiesces in that construction.”). 
169.  See discussion, supra Part IV.A. 
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tendering of a lease’s bonus a condition precedent to the lease’s formation 
or by pairing the lease’s bonus with an “unless” clause. 
Lessors can usurp Irish Oil by making the lessee’s tendering of the 
bonus a condition precedent to the lease’s formation.  When the parties 
agree to a condition precedent, no binding contract exists before the parties 
satisfy the condition.170  As applied within oil and gas leases, precedent 
conditions must be literally performed171 so that a failure to honor a sight 
draft within a prescribed time period warrants cancellation of the lease 
where honoring the draft was a condition precedent to the lease’s 
validation.172  Accordingly, lessors can prevent Irish Oil’s potentially 
draconian results by making the timely tendering of the lease’s bonus a 
condition precedent.  This result can be achieved by including the following 
language:  The full and actual payment of the lease’s bonus shall be the 
only form of consideration acceptable to create a valid lease.  The promise 
or expectation to pay production royalties under the lease shall not be considered 
as any form of consideration, including executory consideration, to create a valid 
lease between the parties.  If such bonus payment is not made to lessor by [a 
specified date], it shall be considered a total failure of consideration and there 
shall be no valid lease or contract. 
Similarly, yet slightly different,173 lessors can contract around Irish Oil 
by pairing a lease’s bonus with an “unless” clause.  In Beaudoin v. JB 
Mineral Services, LLC,174 the North Dakota Supreme Court refused to 
extend Irish Oil to situations involving “unless” clauses.175  With such a 
lease, the lease automatically terminates where the lease provides that the 
lease shall terminate unless the lessee tenders the lease’s consideration by a 
specific date and the lessee fails to do so.  Accordingly, lessors can prevent 
Irish Oil’s operation by including a provision that stipulates that the lease 
will be null and void unless the lessee tenders the lease’s bonus within a 
specific time period, which would have the same practical effect as this 
article’s proposal.  Thus, although Irish Oil continues to threaten lessor 
 
170.  Airport Inn Enter., Inc. v. Ramage, 2004 ND 92, ¶ 11, 679 N.W.2d 269, 272. 
171.  Paraffine Oil Co. v. Cruce, 162 P. 716, 722 (Okla. 1916). 
172.  Clawson v. Berklund, 610 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Mont. 1980). 
173.  Although similar to precedent conditions, “unless” clauses are inherently 
distinguishable.  With condition’s precedent, no contract exists if the condition precedent is 
unsatisfied.  Airport Inn Enterprises, 2004 ND ¶ 11, 679 N.W.2d at 272.  Contrastingly, an unless 
clause invalidates an already existing contract based upon a parties’ failure to perform a particular 
action.  See Norman Jessen & Assoc., Inc. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 305 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D. 
1981). 
174.  2011 ND 229, 808 N.W.2d 672. 
175.  Id. ¶ 11, 808 N.W.2d at 674 
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interests, lessors can still protect their interests by including simple 
provisions that emphasize the importance of lease bonuses. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Bakken oil boom is an economic godsend for North Dakota that 
continues to present daunting and unprecedented challenges.  Using 
hindsight from past booms and busts, public officials have mitigated some 
of the boom’s consequences.  However, these officials have yet to 
recognize that North Dakota’s current statutory scheme allows lessees to 
take advantage of unassuming lessors through the use of legal technicalities 
that frustrate numerous policy aims, as indicated by Irish Oil.  These 
unpalatable results are precisely why protection of lessor interests must 
remain of the utmost importance.176  In order to effectuate this end, North 
Dakota must adopt a statute that automatically terminates a lease, without 
the need for judicial intervention, if a lessee fails to tender a lease’s bonus 
with thirty days of the lease’s execution, the lessor subsequently notifies the 
lessee, in writing, of such a delinquency, and the lessee fails to redress the 
situation within fifteen additional days.  To do otherwise leads to decisions, 
such as Irish Oil, that are a “disservice to those lessors who may have their 
mineral estate found worthless and receive no bonus.”177 
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176.  Moerman v. Prairie Rose Res., Inc. 308 P.3d 75, 79 (Mont. 2013). 
177.  Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Reimer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 63, 794 N.W.2d 715, 731 (VandeWalle, 
C.J., dissenting). 
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